Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 24 | Issue 1

Article 7

2016

Deaccessioning: A Pragmatic Approach
Ardis E. Strong

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons,
Intellectual Property Law Commons, Nonprofit Organizations Law Commons, and the Property
Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Ardis E. Strong, Deaccessioning: A Pragmatic Approach, 24 J. L. & Pol'y (2016).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol24/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

DEACCESSIONING: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
Ardis E. Strong*
Art museums are curators of ideas, preservers of culture, and
educators on the evolving aesthetics and morals of society. As
such, they play an important role in contemporary society and
should be accessible to a wide and diverse audience. One
important debate in how museums best serve the public interest
involves the museum practice of deaccessioning. Historically,
policies governing the proceeds museums receive when they
deaccession (or remove) work from their collection have strictly
limited the use of these funds to the purchase of new art. This
policy is based on the idea that museums hold art for the public
trust and should therefore keep their collection separate from
other museum assets. These ideas are relatively uncontroversial
when dealing with financially healthy museums. However, the past
decade has seen many museums struggling to keep the doors open
and audiences engaged.
The debate over deaccessioning resurfaces each time a
museum on the brink of closure breaks industry rules by selling
work to pay for museum operations. While recognizing the
importance of the museum’s role in keeping art in the public trust,
this note questions whether the closure of a museum ever serves
the public interest. Several prominent art lawyers and art critics
have advocated for relaxing the rules governing the use of
deaccessioning funds and allowing deaccessioned work to remain
accessible to the public. These proposals appear to have little
traction among industry regulators who enforce deaccessioning
rules largely through sanctions and public condemnation. This
note argues that the organizations that regulate museum practices
should take a more proactive approach to assisting struggling
institutions and a more collective approach to collections
management that encourages individual museums to look to the
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wider cultural community when making tough decisions on how
best to serve the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the National Academy Museum in New York City
(the “Academy”) drew stiff sanctions from the Association of Art
Museum Directors (“AAMD”)1 when it sold two works from its
collection.2 The members of the Academy3 sold the two works—
Frederic Edwin Church’s 1854 “Scene on the Magdalene” and
Sanford Robinson Gifford’s 1859 “Mount Mansfield, Vermont”—

* Juris Doctorate Candidate, Brooklyn Law School. Masters of Arts, Art
Education, Teachers College, Columbia University. Bachelor of Arts, Fine Arts,
The George Washington University. The author would like to thank her family
for their unfailing support and encouragement.
1
The Association of Art Museum Directors is a professional organization of art
museum directors whose mission involves “establishing and maintaining the
highest standards of professional practice, serving as forum for the exchange of
information and ideas, acting as an advocate for its member art museums, and
being a leader in shaping public discourse about the arts community and the role
of art in society.” Mission, ASS’N ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS,
https://aamd.org/about/mission (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). Violating the
AAMD’s code of ethics may result in loss of membership as well as sanctions
that prevent the violating museum from receiving loans of artworks or
participating in shared exhibitions with other institutions. Code of Ethics, ASS’N
ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS [hereinafter AAMD Code of Ethics],
https://aamd.org/about/code-of-ethics (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
2
Robin Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, the National Academy Is Struggling
to Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pogrebin, Branded a
Pariah], http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/arts/design/23acad.html.
3
The National Academy is an organization founded by artists and
architects to foster art and design in America outside of the traditional system of
aristocratic patronage. History, NAT’L ACAD. MUSEUM, http://www.national
academy.org/about-us/history/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). Current members of
the Academy, called academicians, elect new members. Id. Upon induction into
the academy, academicians must contribute a work of art to the National
Academy for exhibit and educational purposes. Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah,
supra note 2. The National Academy currently has over 300 members and a
collection of over 7,000 artworks. History, supra. It operates a museum and an
art school in New York’s Upper East Side. Id.
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to an unnamed private foundation for $13.5 million.4 Faced with a
growing deficit, a sharply declining endowment, and imminent layoffs, the Academy needed funds to avoid losing its building on
Fifth Avenue’s Museum Mile.5 Rather than sell the building, the
members, themselves artists with work in the Academy’s
collection, voted to sell the two 19th Century works.6 In selling
these works to ensure the survival of the institution, the Academy
violated one of the major tenets of current museum
administration—that the works in a museum’s collection are not
“fungible asset[s].”7
A museum’s practice of selling works from its collection is
known as “deaccessioning.”8 Although deaccessioning is a
common practice within the museum industry, it can be extremely
controversial. As such, the AAMD’s Code of Ethics contains
specific guidelines that museums must follow when
deaccessioning work from their collections.9 One important rule is
that museums can only sell work from their collections in order to
raise capital for the purchase of new works.10 The Academy
4

Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, supra note 2; see also Randy Kennedy,
National Academy Sells Two Hudson River School Paintings to Bolster its
Finances, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/
arts/design/06acad.html (discussing the sale of the two works).
5
See Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, supra note 2; Kennedy, supra note 4.
6
Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, supra note 2 (“[T]he [member] artists
agonized over the proposal to sell the works before voting 183 to 1 in favor.”).
7
Robin Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending for Museum, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.18,
2010) [hereinafter Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending], http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/19/arts/design/19sanctions.html.
8
Derek Fincham, Deaccession of Art from the Public Trust, 16 J. ART,
ANTIQUITY & L. 93, 94 (2011).
9
The AAMD’s Code of Ethics outlines the duties and rules of professional
conduct expected of museum directors. See ASS’N ART MUSEUM DIRS.,
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS 17 app. at 17–19 (2011)
[hereinafter AAMD, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES], https://aamd.org/sites/default
/files/document/2011ProfessionalPracitiesinArtMuseums.pdf. It is designed to
uphold public trust in museums and avoid conflicts of interest or other
questionable legal activities. Id. at 17.
10
Id. at 18. One provision of the code of ethics relates directly to the
director’s role in deaccessioning: “[T]he director must not dispose of
accessioned works of art in order to provide funds for purposes other than
acquisitions of works of art for the collection.” Id.
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violated this rule by using the funds from the Church/Gifford sale
to replenish its operating budget.11
The AAMD lifted the sanctions against the Academy in 2010,
after the museum worked with the AAMD to change its policies
and develop more secure financial strategies.12 However, the 190year-old institution remained on probation until 2015.13 Carmine
Branagan, the director of the Academy, described the sanctions as
“very, very painful”14 but noted that they ultimately made the
museum stronger.15 Despite the recognition of the damage caused
by these sanctions, the threat of sanctions did not sufficiently deter
deaccessioning in the first place.
Financial crises and threats of possible closure will force other
museums to similarly weigh their options and decide how best to
proceed. For the Academy, it was better to accept the sanctions
than risk closure.16 The rules governing the museum industry,
however, make it difficult for a struggling museum to practice this
kind of serious introspection.17 By limiting how a museum may
11

See Robin Pogrebin, A Chastised Museum Returns to Life, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Pogrebin, A Chastised Museum],
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/arts/design/national-academy-museum-ret
urns-to-life-after-scolding.html.
12
See Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending, supra note 7.
13
Pogrebin, A Chastised Museum, supra note 11.
14
Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending, supra note 7.
15
Id.
16
Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, supra note 2.
17
The American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) and the Association of
Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) are the “two most influential museum
associations in the United States.” Fincham, supra note 8, at 98. The AAM is a
21,000-member organization that supports museums through advocacy,
development of best practices, and career and resource development. About Us,
AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, http://aam-us.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 18,
2015). The AAM includes art museums, military museums, history museums,
zoos, and much more. Id. Both organizations have strict policies on
deaccessioning that limit how funds from deaccessioning can be used. See Code
of Ethics, AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS [hereinafter AAM Code of Ethics],
http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-ofethics (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD
POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING (2010) [hereinafter AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING], https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Pol
icy%20on%20Deaccessioning%20website.pdf. Due to the lack of formal legal
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allocate the proceeds from deaccessioning, guidelines like the
AAMD’s intentionally eliminate a major revenue source for an
institution.18 Furthermore, the AAMD’s policy creates a dichotomy
in which larger, cash-rich museums can regularly deaccession
work with little consequence because they can promptly use the
money to buy more art,19 while small, struggling institutions
receive heavy sanctions for using deaccessioning to simply remain
open.20 If, as the AAMD Code of Ethics states, the purpose of the
art museum is truly to “serve and educate the public through
collection, research, preservation, exhibition, and the advancement
of knowledge about works of art,”21 then the rules governing
deaccessioning should be flexible enough to ensure that all
institutions, regardless of size or level of financial stability, can
fulfill that mission to the public when faced with economic crises.
This Note argues that current rules for deaccessioning overly
burden smaller institutions and should be changed to embrace a
strategy of community-based collections management. Although
strict guidelines for deaccessioning provide important protections
for museum collections, they do not always further the larger goal
of providing public access to great works of art.22 The
organizations that regulate museums—the AAMD and the
American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”)—should allow
oversight, these guidelines act as “powerful norms” within the museum
community. See Fincham, supra note 8.
18
See Christopher Knight, Museum Deaccessioning Done Right, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-cadeaccession 15-2009mar15-story.html (“Professional standards prohibit [the
selling of major works to raise operating funds] because museums exist to
support art, not the other way around.”).
19
See Donn Zaretsky, You Say “Ransom,” I Say “A More Comfortable
Distribution of Resources,” ART L. BLOG (July 9, 2007, 10:21 PM),
http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2007/07/you-say-ransom-i-say-more-comfor
table.html.
20
See Donn Zaretsky, Some Works Will Be Sold at Christie’s Spring
Auctions, ART L. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 11:44 PM), http://theartlawblog.
blogspot.com/2009/03/some-works-will-be-sold-at-christies.html.
21
AAMD Code of Ethics, supra note 1.
22
See Donn Zaretsky, I Think They Need Better Talking Points, ART L.
BLOG (Mar. 31, 2009, 3:40 PM), http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/ithink-they-need-better-talking-points.html.
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financially struggling museums to use deaccessioning funds for
purposes other than collections management, provided that these
institutions meet certain criteria regarding their long-term financial
solubility and their commitments to provide public access to their
collections. With the guidance and supervision of the AAMD and
the AAM, these museums could work to ensure that the artwork
they deaccession stays in the public trust and that deaccessioning
does not become a permanent fundraising tool for the institution.23
By providing assistance and oversight in these difficult matters, the
AAMD and the AAM could prevent the closure of regionally
important museums and further the larger mission of the museum
industry to “serve and educate the public.”24
Part I of this Note provides a background on deaccessioning in
the context of American museum practices. Part II looks at recent
controversies involving deaccessioning through the lens of
industry self-regulation. Part III examines how some restrictions
on deaccessioning can help preserve the financial well-being of
museums. Part IV analyzes four museums that closed in the past
five years due to financial crises and examines the impact these
closures have had on the communities in which the museums were
located. Part V recommends ways to strengthen deaccessioning
policies within both individual museums and across the wider
museum community. One recommendation involves improving the
23

There are many critics of deaccessioning, and one of their major critiques
is that works are often sold to private buyers, and thus become unavailable to the
public. See Jori Finkel, Whose Rules Are These Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/arts/design/28fink.html?pagewante
d=1&_r=0 (“[M]useums get tax-deductible donations of art and cash to
safeguard art collections for the public. Selling off any holdings for profit would
thus betray that trust, they say, not to mention rob a community of art, so no
exceptions for financial hardships should be allowed.”). Removing art from the
public trust is problematic not only because museums operate for the benefit of
the public, but also because donations comprise the majority of museum
collections. See Mary Varson Cromer, Don’t Give Me That!: Tax Valuation of
Gifts to Art Museums, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 777, 780, 795 (2006); Lauren
McBrayer, The Art of Deaccessioning: An Ethical Approach, SK061 A.L.I.–
A.B.A. 339, 344–45 (2005). Many donors expect that museums will protect and
display their donated works, not sell their works to raise money for other
expenses. See Cromer, supra; McBrayer, supra.
24
AAMD Code of Ethics, supra note 1.
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incentives for unrestricted donations to museums. A second
recommendation suggests the adoption of a community-wide
collections management strategy that will further the interests not
only of the individual institutions but also of the larger
communities they serve. Such an approach would allow museums
to deaccession work in order to remain open, while still serving the
underpinning goals of current professional guidelines.
I. HISTORY OF DEACCESSIONING IN AMERICAN MUSEUMS
A. The Issue of Art Ownership in American Museums
The Metropolitan Museum of Art (the “Met”) pushed the
practice of deaccessioning into the public light in 1972 when it
sold works donated by prominent collector Adelaide Milton de
Groot.25 De Groot died in 1967 and bequeathed her collection of
European Old Masters and Post-Impressionists to the Met with the
stipulation that the Met:
[is] not to sell any of said works of art, but to keep
such of said works of art as it desires to retain for
itself, and to give the balance to such one or more
important Museums as said Metropolitan Museum
of Art shall select, giving preference, first, to
Museums situated in the Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York, second to Museums situated
elsewhere in the State of New York, and third, to
Museums situated in the State of Connecticut.26
Five years later, the Met “quietly sold” a number of works from
the de Groot collection in order to replenish funds which were used
to purchase Diego Velazquez’s Portrait of Juan de Pareja.27
25

Harry Weintraub, Museums With Walls: Public Regulation of
Deaccessioning and Disposal, ART & L., Fall 1975, at 1, 1–5.
26
Id.
27
See Fincham, supra note 8, at 113. Diego Velazquez’s Portrait of Juan
de Pareja cost the Met a record breaking $5.6 million dollars. See id. The Met
also likely used funds from deaccessioning the de Groot paintings to acquire the
Euphronios Krater, a masterwork of Greek Antiquity that authorities later
proved was illegally excavated from an Etruscan tomb. See id. While there is no
direct link between the purchase of the Euphronios Krater and the sale of the de
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According to the Met, de Groot’s request was not legally binding28
and the works were of inferior quality compared with others in the
collection.29 This sale drew criticism from donors, the public, and
the New York State Legislature.30 The New York Attorney
General investigated the sale but ultimately cleared the Met of any
wrongdoing.31 While the Met demonstrated questionable ethics in
deaccessioning works against the donor’s intent, its efforts were
relatively customary.32 The Met used the funds from the
deaccessioned work to refine and expand its collection thus
enhancing its cultural influence.33 The Met’s reasons for
deaccessioning and its use of the funds from the sale meet today’s
Groot Collection, the fact that these transactions and the Velazquez purchase
occurred during the same year, 1972, is telling. The N.Y. Times reported, in
February 1973, that the Met raised the funds needed to buy the Krater by selling
ancient coins worth $1.2 million, but all museum curators were under pressure at
the time to deaccession work because the museum “was in dire need of funds.”
Nicholas Gage, How the Metropolitan Acquired “The Finest Greek Vase There
Is,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1973), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/arts
/Metacquired.pdf). From its initial acquisition of the Krater, the Met faced
questions about the origins of the vase. See id. In 2006, the Met reached an
agreement with Italian authorities in which the Met would return the Krater
illegally excavated from Italian soil in exchange for “long-term loans of objects
from Italian collections of equivalent importance and beauty.” Elisabetta
Povoledo, Met to Sign Accord in Italy to Return Vase and Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/arts/design/21anti.html.
28
Weintraub, supra note 25, at 5.
29
See Fincham, supra note 8, at 113. Today there are specific guidelines
for why a museum can deaccession a work in its collection. See AAMD POLICY
ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § 1(B). Although these rules were not in
place in 1972, the museum industry generally accepts “poor quality” as a reason
to deaccession art. See id. at § 2(A). Whether these works were truly of poor
quality is a matter of opinion. The collection included works by van Gogh,
Renoir, Henri Rousseau and other prominent artists from that era. Fincham,
supra note 8, at 113.
30
See Fincham, supra note 8, at 113–14.
31
Id. at 114; Weintraub, supra note 25, at 6–7; John L. Hess, Lefkowitz
Opens Inquiry Into Art Sales by the Met, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1973, at 1.
32
See Weintraub, supra note 25, at 5–6.
33
See id. (describing the various reasons for deaccessioning and disposal,
including “opportunities to acquire finer examples of the same kind of object, an
attempt to bring a greater balance to the collection, or a curatorial judgment as to
the lessening of an object’s aesthetic and/or historical worth”).
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professional standards.34 Barring any wrongdoing concerning
donor intent, the Met would likely avoid sanctions if a similar sale
happened today.
Much of the controversy surrounding deaccessioning involves
the deeper question of who owns the art in museums. In the case
above, the Met operated as the owner of the work from the de
Groot collection and exercised full dominion and control of the
works just as a private collector might.35 However, if the museum
is considered a “public trust,” a view common in Europe and also
supported by many in the United States,36 then it is the public, not
the museum, who actually “owns” the work.37 The Met expressly
ignored the wishes of donor Adelaide de Groot, who clearly
intended her gift to remain in the public domain even if the work

34

See AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § 1(B)
(discussing that funds received from the disposal of a deaccessioned work “may
be used only for the acquisition of works in a manner consistent with the
museum’s policy on the use of restricted acquisition funds”).
35
In fact, many proponents of deaccessioning, as well as many museum
directors, view museums as the owners of the art in their collection. While they
recognize the duty of the museum to provide public access, they do not believe
the public owns the art, but rather view the art as a fluid aspect of the museum’s
larger mission. See Donn Zaretsky, More on Deaccessioning, ART L. BLOG
(Dec. 17, 2008, 10:39 AM) http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2008/12/more-ondeaccessioning.html (“It seems such a phony metaphor, this notion that
everything owned by every art museum actually ‘belongs’ to the public . . . .
Stuff is owned by museums for the benefit of the public, but stuff isn’t owned
directly by the public . . . . And maybe we should be thankful it’s not owned
outright by the public, who may have sold out long ago to pay for sports
stadiums or to balance city budgets or whatever.”); see also Carol Vogel,
Museums Set to Sell Art, and Some Experts Cringe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/arts/design/museums-set-to-sell-art-andsome-experts-cringe.html (“When the collection was initially developed, Conger
Goodyear, the museum’s first president, said it would have the same
permanence as a river—we know what direction it is going in, but it has to be
fluid. That’s how we operate.”).
36
See Heather Hope Stephens, All in a Day’s Work: How Museums May
Approach Deaccessioning as a Necessary Collections Management Tool, 22
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 119, 122–23 (2011); see also James
Panero, What’s a Museum?, NEW CRITERION, Mar. 2012, at 4, 6–8 (explaining
the history and role of museums in Europe).
37
See Stephens, supra note 36, at 122–23.
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was not housed at the Met.38 From a public policy viewpoint, one
could argue that de Groot actually bequeathed her collection to the
people of New York and that the Met simply served as the
protector and trustee of the work.39 This perspective casts doubt on
whether the public benefitted from the exchange of the Velazquez
painting and the stolen Greek vase for the de Groot paintings.40
The National Academy Museum case further complicates this
picture of ownership. The Academy does not purchase artwork;
instead, artists who serve as members of the Academy donated the
7,000 works of American art in its collection.41 In fact, the
Academy requires members to make such donations in order to
become members.42 Thus, the Academy would never have the
opportunity to use deaccessioning funds in accordance with the
current AAMD guidelines.43 The Academy, whose mission is to
educate and support American artists and architects,44 is arguably
more responsible to its artist-members than to the larger public.
The Academy is not a public institution and does not answer to the
New York Board of Regents, which oversees other cultural and
educational institutions in the state, because it was founded prior to
the establishment of the Board of Regents.45 However, the current
rules regarding deaccessioning treat the Academy in the same way
as they would a museum that regularly uses deaccessioning to
expand and maintain its collections.46
These scenarios reveal the complicated lines of ownership that
plague the management of collections for museums. If the museum
38

Weintraub, supra note 25, at 5. De Groot’s will stipulates that if the Met
did not retain the work it would be given to other museums in the region with a
focus on Manhattan and then the people of New York and Connecticut. She did
give the Met permission to sell the work to private collectors. Id.
39
See id.
40
See id. at 1, 5.
41
Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, supra note 2.
42
Id.
43
See id.; AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § 1(B).
44
See History, supra note 3.
45
See id.; Fincham, supra note 8, at 121.
46
There is no exception in the AAMD’s deaccessioning guidelines for
museums that do not acquire new work through purchases. See AAMD POLICY
ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § 1(B).
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owns the work, the museum board should be able to use or sell the
work to further the best interests of the museum.47 If the public
owns the work, on the other hand, then the museum board should
use the work in ways that prioritize the best interests of the public,
which are based on the museum’s broad mission of collecting and
preserving works and educating and enriching the community.48
Finally, if donors can retain some control of their gifts, as is the
case with the National Academy, then they should also be able to
control the use of funds generated by the subsequent sale of their
gifts.49 All of these assumptions, however, potentially run counter
to the current guidelines that regulate deaccessioning.
Deaccessioning guidelines should therefore change so as to fall in
line with a reality that serves a variety of ownership interests.
B. History of Deaccessioning as a Legal Issue
Until the de Groot scandal at the Met, few people knew about
or understood museum deaccessioning practices.50 However, this
47

See Fincham, supra note 8, at 96. This is generally the stance taken by a
corporate law approach to the governing of nonprofit organizations such as
museums. See id. at 97–98. Courts that take this approach are reluctant to
overturn decisions made by the museum board unless there are signs of gross
negligence or illegality on the part of board members. Id.
48
See id. at 112. This argument stems largely from the public trust doctrine
that has its roots in Environmental Law and land rights. Id. at 114–115. If art is
part of the public trust, the same way rivers and parklands are, then preserving
art for the enjoyment and benefit of future generations should be the first
priority of museums. If this is the case, then is deaccessioning ever an
acceptable option? See generally id. at 114–16 (discussing the public trust
doctrine in the context of property and environmental law and how owners of
property which falls under the public trust must preserve the public’s right to
access and use).
49
In fact, the Academy objected to the AAMD sanctions arguing that
because the Academy did not purchase any art, it should not be held to the same
standards governing the use of funds from deaccessioning. See id. at 121.
50
See Stephen K. Urice, Deaccessioning: A Few Observations, SR005
A.L.I.–A.B.A. 207, 209 (2010); see also Weintraub, supra note 25, at 1
(explaining that the public was largely unaware of museum deaccessioning
practices until the New York Times uncovered the practices that became the de
Groot scandal in 1972); see also Fincham, supra note 8, at 120 (footnote
omitted) (“Given the controversy which often surrounds deaccessioning,

252

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

case, combined with scandals at the Brooklyn Museum of Art and
the Museum of the American Indian,51 prompted the New York
Attorney General to call for greater restrictions and a clearer
museum policy regarding deaccessioning by New York
institutions.52 Today, a museum’s decision to deaccession work
garners more public scrutiny than it would have forty years ago,
meaning museums have greater incentive to uphold a high standard
of ethics in their deaccessioning practices.53 The governing bodies
of the museum industry, the AAM and the AAMD, have strict
ethical guidelines for collections management.54 While these
guidelines are not legally binding, violating the code of ethics of
either organization draws significant punitive punishments.55 The
fear of bad press and the threat of sanctions by the museum

museums often attempt to make deaccessions as quickly and quietly as possible.
In fact, in the early 1970s museums often attempted to avoid any publicity—a
troubling trend which continues today.”).
51
See William Twaddle, Museum Activities: Acquisition and Disposition of
Art Objects, 4 ART & L. 67, 67–69 (1979) (explaining the controversy at the
Brooklyn Museum of Art in which the curator of primitive art, Michael Kan,
was charged with selling American Indian artifacts from the museum’s
collection to a well-known dealer in exchange for items for his personal art
collection); see also Weintraub, supra note 25, at 1 (detailing the scandals at the
Met and the Museum of the American Indian).
52
See Chris Burgess & Rachel Shane, Deaccessioning: A Policy
Perspective, 41 J. ARTS MGMT., L. & SOC’Y 170, 172 (2011).
53
Fincham, supra note 8, at 114.
54
Id. at 125; see also AAM Code of Ethics, supra note 17; AAMD POLICY
ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17.
55
AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § VIII
(explaining that members who violate these policies “may be subject to censure,
suspension, and/or expulsion”); see also Press Release, Dewey Blanton, Am.
All. of Museums, Statement on the Deaccessioning by the Delaware Art
Museum and the Action taken by the AAM Accreditation Commission
http://www.aam-us.org/about-us/media-room/2014/delaware-accreditationstatus (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (“On June 17, 2014, the AAM Accreditation
Commission unanimously voted to remove the Delaware Art Museum’s
accredited status in response to the board’s decision of March 26, 2014, to
deaccession and to sell works from the collections for purposes other than
acquisitions or direct care of collections.”).
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industry largely encourage compliance with ethical guidelines by
museums.56
1. American Museums versus European Museums
Deaccessioning is rare in Europe and is subject to strict
guidelines.57 This is, in part, because the European public views its
great museums as cultural repositories that seek to preserve a
national identity.58 The government owns and operates many of
these museums and government leaders appoint museum boards.59
The artwork in European museums takes on a nationalistic quality
tied to memories of past heroes or conquests.60 Selling the artwork

56

See Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending, supra note 7 (“You’re completely
incapable of designing exhibition programming going forward because you
can’t loan and you can’t get loans, and sanctions also affect funding. Sanctions
were very, very painful.”).
57
For example, “[t]he British Museum Act of 1963 allows works to be
deaccessioned from the collection only if they are duplicates of other works or
are so damaged as to be ‘useless.’” Henry Lydiate, Deaccessioning Public
Collections, ART MONTHLY, July 2011, at 348, 348. In France, rules against
deaccessioning have existed since the 16th century: “any work that enters a
French national museum collection has been considered legally ‘inalienable’—
meaning it can only be sold or given away after a lengthy procedure to delist it.”
Lee Rosenbaum, Cultural Patrimony Alerts: Italian Pollution Risks, French
Deaccession Discussions, ARTS J. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2007/10/cultural_patrimony_alerts_ital.h
tml.
58
See Panero, supra note 36, at 6. For example, Britain’s National Gallery
was founded by the House of Commons “on behalf of the British people by their
lawful representatives.” Id. at 6. During World War II, Churchill refused to
allow the collection to leave England, signaling the importance of the collection
“to the identity of the nation.” Id. at 5. The Louvre was founded to display the
spoils of the French Revolution, exhibiting the nationalized treasures seized
from the monarchy in a former Bourbon Palace just blocks away from the
square where the members of the ruling aristocracy met the guillotine. Id. at 7.
59
Id. at 7.
60
See generally NOAH CHARNEY, STEALING OF THE MYSTIC LAMB: THE
TRUE STORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST COVETED MASTERPIECE 79–102 (2010)
(outlining how Napoleon further cemented the Louvre’s importance by
harnessing the “symbolic power in the capture and display of the cultural
treasures of fallen nations”).
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for any reason may result in loss of government funding (the
primary source of revenue) for an offending institution.61
In America, private individuals seeking to promote personal
ideals generally founded and supported museums.62 Lack of
government control and private support is part of American
museum culture.63 The idea of “private wealth transferred to the
public trust”64 was seen as a manifestation of American virtue
based on the belief that “a virtuous people with a passion for the
public good might create institutions in the public interest that
could one day rival or even exceed the great museums of Europe,
all without the compulsion of the government.”65 Such reliance on
private philanthropy has, however, prevented many museums from
reaping the benefits of the stable funding source that museums in
many European countries enjoy and has forced American museums
to take a more pragmatic approach to deaccessioning than their
European counterparts.66
2. The Structure of American Museums
Most museums in the United States operate as either nonprofit
corporations or as charitable trusts.67 Although the structure has
little effect on the mission and day-to-day operations, it can have
61

See Jillian Steinhauer, Deaccessioning Crisis Has UK Museums Group
Contemplating Stricter Guidelines, HYPERALLERGIC (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://hyperallergic.com/171802/deaccessioning-crisis-has-uk-museums-groupcontemplating-stricter-guidelines/ (describing how the Northampton Museum
and Art Gallery in England sold an Egyptian sculpture in the summer of 2014
for £15.8 million, causing the Northampton Museum to lose its accreditation,
and thus, funding from the Heritage Lottery Fund).
62
Panero, supra note 36, at 7.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 8.
66
Id. at 7; see also Knight, supra note 18 (“It’s called the permanent
collection, but permanent doesn’t mean dead. Unlike in Europe, where many art
museums are government treasure houses and nothing is sold, American
museum collections are living organisms. They take shape over time.”).
67
Virginia D. Ryan, Balancing Donor Intent with Museum Needs:
Proposed Deaccession Planning Strategies for Art Bequeathed to Museums, 101
KY. L.J. 863, 864 (2013).
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significant legal implications with regards to the deaccessioning of
its collection.68 Trust law generally applies a much higher fiduciary
standard on the actions of museum trustees than corporate law does
on the actions of boards-of-directors of nonprofit corporations.69
Museums that are nonprofit corporations or part of institutions of
higher learning may more easily survive legal challenges to
deaccessioning because of the business judgment rule, which
“permits directors to use their own judgment and excuses simple
errors.”70 Thus, museum boards that operate under the laws of
nonprofit corporations generally have more freedom to make
decisions about the institutions’ missions and finances.71
Even if the museum is a nonprofit corporation that benefits
from the flexibility of the business judgment rule, the board, like
trustees of a charitable trust, must operate for the benefit of the
public.72 Because of the special tax status the government grants to
both entities, all significant decisions must be made with the
public’s interest in mind.73 State attorneys general are tasked with
challenging questionable museum practices.74 However, many
attorneys general are reluctant to challenge the legality of a

68

See Jennifer L. White, When it’s OK to Sell the Monet: A TrusteeFiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning Decisions of Art
to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (1996).
69
Id. (“The directors of for-profit corporations, while fulfilling duties
similar to those of trustees, generally are held to a lower standard of care.”).
70
Id. at 1053. For an example of the business judgment rule applied to the
decisions of museum boards, see the case of the Albright-Knox Gallery in
Buffalo, NY. Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, 836 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct.
2007).
71
See Jorja Ackers Cirigliana, Let Them Sell Art: Why a Broader
Deaccession Policy Today Could Save Museums Tomorrow, 20 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 365, 372 (2010); White, supra note 68, at 1048.
72
White, supra note 68, at 1049.
73
Id. at 1049–50.
74
See id. at 1051; see also Burgess & Shane, supra note 52, at 178 (“State
attorney generals [sic] have legal authority over nonprofits, and it is part of their
responsibility to engage in the policy debates and issues affecting the nonprofit
community.”).
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museum’s deaccessioning practice.75 More often, other members
of the community bring forth such challenges.76 Attorneys general
have primarily taken a hands-off approach, allowing the museums
and professional organizations to create policies and guidelines
aimed at self-regulation.77
3. Self-Regulation in American Museum Culture
The original intent of the founders of American museums,
namely that private philanthropy should support the creation of
public institutions, has fostered the assumption that museums
operate as a public trust no matter their form of organization.78
This ideal places enormous pressure on museum trustees to make
decisions in the best interests of the public.79 When institutions are
faced with the option of deaccessioning or closure, opponents of
deaccessioning often blame the museum trustees for breaching
their fiduciary duties to the public.80 These critics argue that a
museum board that breaches its fiduciary duty to the public should
be shut down to allow other museums, with better management, to
prosper.81 Others claim that preventing boards from using
75

See Burgess & Shane, supra note 52, at 182 (“[T]he focus has been on
self-regulation with little government actor influence.”); see also Fincham,
supra note 8, at 102–03.
76
See, e.g., Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, 836 N.Y.S.2d. 498 (Sup.
Ct. 2007). For more information about the Fisk University case, see infra Part II,
section A.
77
See Burgess & Shane, supra note 52, at 183.
78
See Stephens, supra note 36, at 122, n.7.
79
White, supra note 68, at 1052 (“The trustee standard of loyalty requires
the trustee to ‘administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries,’
which is the general public in the case of a charitable trust. The trustee must
display complete loyalty to the interests of the public.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 170 (1990))).
80
See Urice, supra note 50, at 213; see also White, supra note 68, at 1051–
54 (discussing the fiduciary duties of trustees and directors).
81
Tyler Green, Failure Is An Option, MODERN ART NOTES, (Jan. 5, 2009,
11:06 AM), http://blogs.artinfo.com/modernartnotes/2009/01/failure-is-an-opti
on/; see also Urice, supra note 50, at 213 (“[R]enegade museums that flout best
practices and ethical norms for the application of proceeds from deaccessioning
pose a considerable risk to the wider museum community.”). Art lawyer Donn
Zaretsky describes this position as a “moral hazard” argument. Donn Zaretsky,
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deaccessioning to fund operations serves as a “discipline device
over managers.”82 Strict rules prevent boards from using their
collections as a “safety net” to cover poor decision-making.83
These attitudes have fostered a culture of self-regulation in the
American museum industry and have given significant power to
the organizations that regulate museum behavior.84
The Professional Codes of Ethics that both the AAMD and the
AAM have developed reflect each organization’s desire for a selfregulated industry.85 These guidelines include provisions outlining
the conditions during which deaccessioning is appropriate and the
methods through which museums may allocate the profits collected
from such deaccessioning.86 Both organizations require that
deaccessioning be practiced only in furtherance of the museum’s

Fresno Museum Closes its Doors Through Lack of Finances, ART L. BLOG (Jan.
6, 2010, 9:33 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/
economy/article24569599.html.
82
Michael Rushton, Economics of Deaccessioning (a Bit Theoretical), FOR
WHAT IT’S WORTH (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.artsjournal.com
/worth/2014/03/economics-of-deaccessioning-a-bit-theoretical/; see also Andrej
Srakar, Deaccessioning and Agency Costs or Free Cash Flow in Manager’s
Hands: A Formal Model, 16 ECON. & BUS. REV. 225, 226 (2015) (explaining
that strict limitations on the use of funds from deaccessioning can reduce agency
costs).
83
Rushton, supra note 82 (explaining how the rules on deaccessioning
parallel financial corporations that carry larger debt than necessary in order to
encourage better oversight by managers or risk bankruptcy).
84
See id. (“By creating a culture against deaccessioning-for-operatingfunds, by having strong sanctions against any museum that acts against the rules,
museum trustees are able to constrain management (‘don’t think you can sell art
if you run into financial troubles – it cannot be done’) and satisfy donors (‘we
couldn’t sell your work for operating funds even if we wanted to, the penalties
are too great’).”).
85
See AAM Code of Ethics, supra note 17 (discussing how museums are
responsible for more than compliance with laws and that they “must take
affirmative steps to maintain their integrity so as to warrant public
confidence”); see also AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at §
A (illustrating how the AAMD encourages self-regulated industry by requiring
the museums to develop clear policies).
86
See AAM Code of Ethics, supra note 17; AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § II.
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mission.87 Specifically, the AAM prohibits a museum from using
funds from the disposal of deaccessioned work for any purpose
“other than acquisition or direct care of collections,” and the
AAMD permits such funds to “be used only for the acquisition of
works in a manner consistent with the museum’s policy on the use
of restricted acquisition funds.”88 The AAMD policy on
deaccessioning states specific criteria for deaccessioning a work,
such as: (1) the quality of work is poor and cannot be used for
exhibit or study; (2) the work is duplicative; (3) the work is stolen
or acquired by other illegal means; (4) the work is a forgery; (5)
the work is damaged beyond repair; (6) the work is inconsistent
with the museum’s mission or collection goals; and (7) the
museum lacks the capacity to properly care for the work.89
The New York State Board of Regents, the government agency
that charters and oversees museums in New York, amended its
guidelines in 2011.90 In addition to encompassing criteria similar to
the AAMD guidelines, the New York State Board of Reagents
included other notable criteria, such as:91 (1) the item is a hazard to
people or other items in the collection; (2) the item has failed to
retain its identity; or (3) the item is being returned to the donor, or
the donor’s heirs or assigns.92 Although many of the 2,000
museums in New York answer to the Board of Regents,93 this
87

AAM Code of Ethics, supra note 17; AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § I(A).
88
AAM Code of Ethics, supra note 17; AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § I(B).
89
AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at § II.
90
Amy Goldrich, Museum Deaccessioning in NY State, THE ENT., ARTS &
SPORTS L. BLOG (May 20, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://nysbar.com/blogs
/EASL/2011/05/test_post.html.
91
The latest rules on deaccessioning by the New York Board of Regents
went into effect June 8, 2011 and “apply to all museums and historic societies
chartered by the Board of Regents.” Id.
92
Id. These rules are largely seen as broader than AAM and AAMD
guidelines, but narrower than proposed legislation in the New York State
Assembly. Id.
93
See
Join
and
Support,
MUSEUM
ASS’N
OF
N.Y.,
http://manyonline.org/join-and-support (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); see also
Burgess & Shane, supra note 52, at 180 (“The New York State Board of
Regents . . . charters nearly all museums statewide.”).
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group represents only a small portion of the 35,000 museums
located across the United States.94 A few states have similar
regulations governing the management of state-owned museums,95
however, most of the regulations to which museums adhere are
self-imposed. Some legislative proposals have made headway in
recent years96 but these have been met with stringent opposition
from the museum community and professional organizations.97
The longstanding trend of American museums to operate
independently of the government continues today.98
94

Christopher Ingraham, There Are More Museums in the U.S. Than There
Are Starbucks and McDonalds – Combined, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 13,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/13/there-a
re-more-museums-in-the-us-than-there-are-starbucks-and-mcdonaldscombined/.
95
Louisiana and North Carolina both adopted guidelines for deaccessioning
at state operated museums. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 25:345 (2014) (regulating
deaccessioning at the Louisiana State Museum); LA. STAT. ANN. § 25:1101
(2014) (regulating deaccessioning practices at state university art
museums); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 140-5.14 (West 2015) (outlining the duties
and powers of the Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Museum of Art,
including policy regarding deaccessioning work).
96
The Brodsky Bill in New York is one such example of a legislative
response to deaccessioning that was met with a cool response from the museum
community. See Robin Pogrebin, Museums and Lawmakers Mull Sales of Art,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Pogrebin, Museums and Lawmakers],
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/arts/design/15deaccession.html.
The
Brodsky Bill would have created strict rules for deaccessioning and prohibited
museums from selling work to cover operating costs. See Burgess & Shane,
supra note 52, at 180.
97
See Burgess & Shane, supra note 52, at 180 (“The announcement set off
a firestorm of media attention as well as condemnation by professional
associations and museum professionals.”); Robin Pogrebin, Institutions Try to
Slow Bill to Curb Sales of Art, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2009) [hereinafter
Pogrebin, Institutions Try to Slow Bill], http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/
arts/design/23deaccess.html. The legislators involved with the Brodsky Bill
withdrew the bill in August 2010 in the face of sharp criticism from the arts
community, including prominent museums like the Met and the Whitney as well
as the Art Law Committee of the New York Bar. See Cirigliana, supra note 71,
at 380–82; Fincham, supra note 8, at 105.
98
See Carolina A. Miranda, Museums Behaving Badly: Are Sanctions Too
Little, Too Late?, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2014,), http://www.latimes.com
/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-museums-behaving-20140619-column
.html (“Nonprofits such as museums are already governed by many laws, at both
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II. RECENT CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING DEACCESSIONING
This section examines three recent controversies involving
deaccessioning which highlight the legal complications involved
with deaccessioning and illustrate how the industry enforces
professional guidelines through self-regulation. The first example,
involving a body of work that Georgia O’Keeffe donated to Fisk
University, shows how courts approach deaccessioning
controversies through the application of cy pres.99 The second
example looks at the Detroit Institute of Art’s battle to avoid
deaccessioning in the face of the city of Detroit’s bankruptcy and
the public outcry that supported the use of the collection to fund
pensions.100 The final example examines industry self-regulation
through a series of recent sales by the Delaware Art Museum that
have drawn sanctions from the AAMD and AAM.101 All of these
examples reveal an institution’s underlying mission and the larger
goal of bringing art to the public. In each case, the institution
suffered some form of financial crisis and proponents regarded
deaccessioning as a possible solution. The different outcomes are

the state and federal level. Where an issue as complex and specific as
deaccessioning is concerned, our view is that the professional standards of the
art museum field are best established and reinforced by those working in the
field.”).
99
See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). The cy
pres doctrine allows a court to “‘reform[] a written instrument with a gift to
charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible, so that the gift does not
fail.’ Further, ‘[c]ourts use cy pres especially in construing charitable gifts when
the donor’s original charitable purpose cannot be fulfilled.’” Ryan, supra note
67, at 872–73.
100
See Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of Arts,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Kennedy, Grand Bargain],
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit
-institute-of-arts.html; Nathan Bomey, Judge Rhodes Questions Orr: Why Not
Monetize the Art?, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 3, 2014, 6:07 PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/10/03/detroit-ban
kruptcy-dia/16638995/.
101
See Margie Fishman, “Outlier” Delaware Art Museum Shunned by Art
Groups, WILMINGTON (DEL.) NEWS J. (June 19, 2014, 2:57 PM) [hereinafter
Fishman, Outlier], http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/19/
delaware-art-musem-accreditation/10888703/.
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distinct and lead to continued questions about the problem of
ownership and control of the works in a museum.
A. Fisk University’s O’Keeffe Collection
In the late 1940’s, prominent American artist Georgia
O’Keeffe donated 101 works of art to Fisk University, a
historically black college in Nashville, Tennessee.102 Most of the
art was the property of her late husband, noted photographer
Alfred Stieglitz.103 O’Keeffe wanted to make a social statement by
donating such a large gift to an African-American institution,104
and therefore imposed two restrictions on her donation: (1) “the
university [could] not sell the artwork” and (2) “Fisk [must]
display the works as one collection in [its] gallery.”105 In 2005,
however, the university faced financial difficulties forcing it to cut
programs, reduce faculty salaries, and mortgage some of its real
estate.106 In order to strengthen the endowment and increase
funding to the math, biology, and business departments, the
university proposed to sell two of the works from the collection,
O’Keeffe’s Radiator Building—Night, New York and a Marsden
Hartley painting.107 Knowing that the proposed sale would violate
O’Keefe’s restrictions, Fisk University filed an ex parte
declaratory judgment before the works entered auction.108 The
collection was valued to be worth upwards of $60 million at the

102

Ryan, supra note 67, at 871; Christian H. Brill, Art or Assets: University
Museums and the Future of Deaccessioning, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 62, 66
(2011).
103
Ryan, supra note 67, at 871; Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum) v.
Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
104
Brill, supra note 102, at 71.
105
Ryan, supra note 67, at 872.
106
In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); see Ryan,
supra note 67, at 873 (discussing how the $131,000.00 annual cost to maintain
and display the collection “was not compatible with Fisk’s financial situation”).
107
Fincham, supra note 8, at 103; Erik Schelzig, Fisk University Hopes to
Sell O’Keeffe Art, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/23/AR2007102302757.html.
108
Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum), 312 S.W.3d at 7; see also Brill,
supra note 102, at 70–71.
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time.109 The Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation intervened in the suit as
a representative of O’Keeffe’s estate, and the Tennessee Attorney
General also interceded as a representative of the public interest.110
The O’Keeffe Foundation argued that the sale of the two works
violated O’Keeffe’s original intent and, in 2007, the court
agreed.111
Faced with the closure of the Fisk University Art Gallery, Fisk
entered into an agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum of
American Art in Bentonville, Arkansas, to share the collection for
a $30 million dollar interest.112 The O’Keeffe Museum, which had
taken over control of the estate from the O’Keeffe Foundation,
challenged this sale.113 Finding itself in court again, Fisk argued
that this arrangement should be permitted under the cy pres
doctrine, which affords institutions some flexibility to interpret and
use charitable gifts when compliance with the donor’s original
intent is no longer practical.114 In July 2009, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals found that, based on O’Keeffe’s correspondence with
the University, her intent “was to make the collection available to
the public in Nashville and the South for the benefit of those who
did not have access to comparable collections to promote the
general study of art.”115 The court permitted the agreement
between Crystal Bridges and Fisk University to move forward and

109

Fincham, supra note 8, at 103.
Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum), 312 S.W.3d at 7; Fincham, supra
note 8, at 103. The state attorney general often is involved in litigation regarding
changes to a charitable trust. Id. at 101–03. As representative of the people of
the state, the attorney general has standing to challenge decisions made by the
museum trustees that are out of line with the public interest. Id.
111
See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum), 312 S.W.3d at 8; see also
Brill, supra note 102, at 70–71 (discussing the case and the trial courts granting
of the Museum’s motion for summary judgment in June 2007).
112
In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
113
See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum), 312 S.W.3d at 8–9 (discussing
how the O’Keeffe Foundation assigned its interest in the civil action to the
O’Keeffe Museum).
114
In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 584–85; see Ryan, supra note 67, at
872–73.
115
Brill, supra note 102, at 72–73.
110
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removed the trial court’s limitations on how the university could
use the funds.116
The agreement between Fisk University and Crystal Bridges is
a creative solution that preserves an exceptional body of work and
prevents the closure of not only an art museum but also a culturally
important educational institution. Critics of this decision argue that
it weakens museums’ relationships with their donors by inciting
donors’ fears that their intents will not be realized.117 However, the
agreement actually honored O’Keeffe’s intent and arguably
expanded her purpose even further.118 Instead of the collection
being sold to private collectors or sitting in storage for years,119 a
116

In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 586. The trial court ordered Fisk
University to use $20 million to establish an endowment that would support the
management of the collection, and the remaining $10 million was available at
the University’s discretion. Id. In the final deal negotiated between Fisk
University and Crystal Bridges, Alice Walton pledged an additional $1 million
to improve the University’s gallery and the University pledged $3.9 million
towards an endowment for future maintenance of the collection. Fisk University
Sells 50 Percent Stake in Stieglitz Collection to Crystal Bridges Museum,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Aug. 7, 2012), http://philanthropynewsdigest.org/
news/fisk-university-sells-50-percent-stake-in-stieglitz-collection-to-crystalbridges-museum.
117
See Ryan, supra note 67, at 873–74.
118
O’Keeffe’s original charitable intent “was to make the Collection
available to the public in Nashville and the South for the benefit of those who
did not have access to comparable collections.” Georgia O’Keeffe Found.
(Museum), 312 S.W.3d at 17. In its inaugural year, attendance at the Crystal
Bridges Museum, in Bentonville, Arkansas, far exceeded expectations, with
more than 650,000 visitors in 2012. Crystal Bridges to Welcome its OneMillionth Visitor, CRYSTAL BRIDGES MUSEUM OF AM. ART (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://crystalbridges.org/press-releases/crystal-bridges-to-welcome-its-one-milli
onth-visitor/. Fisk University, on the other hand, estimates that less than 10,000
people per year visit its art collections. Alan L. Feld, Who are the Beneficiaries
of Fisk University’s Stieglitz Collection?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 873, 892 n.161
(2011). Displaying the collection at both Fisk University and Crystal Bridges
accomplishes O’Keeffe’s goal and will likely serve a much larger audience than
display at either location alone.
119
See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5361639 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.
March 6, 2008) (discussing whether the storage and non-display of the
Collection since November 2005 constituted a breach of O’Keeffe’s original gift
conditions). The high cost of maintaining the artworks for public display would
have likely resulted in the closing of the university gallery. Ryan, supra note 67,
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much wider audience will enjoy the works. The partnership with
Crystal Bridges expands the Collection’s geographical reach while
continuing O’Keeffe’s desire to support Fisk University.120 In
many ways, the outcome was a victory for both sides.
B. The Detroit Institute of Art
In the case of the Detroit Institute of Art, the pressure to
deaccession work came from an outside source—a bankruptcy
filing by the city of Detroit. The Detroit Museum of Art was
founded in 1885 using donations from wealthy members of Detroit
society, including James E. and George H. Scripps.121 James
Scripps, who in 1889 donated his sizable art collection to the
museum, said, “[f]or several years it has been a favorite idea of
mine that Detroit might be made the art center of the West, just as
Cincinnati is the acknowledged musical center, and just as
Florence is the art and Milan the music center of Italy.”122
In 1919, as the population of Detroit boomed after the success
of the automobile industry, the Museum’s directors ceded control
to the municipal government of Detroit and rebranded the Museum
as the Detroit Institute of Art (DIA).123 The astonishing industrial
success of Detroit in the early 20th Century did not last, however,
and the fate of the DIA has been precariously linked to local
politics for the past 95 years.124 Despite its turbulent history, and
at 871. Even had an arrangement been made with another Nashville institution
to display the Steiglitz Collection, O’Keeffe’s original intent to display the work
for the benefit of the students at Fisk would have been disrupted. See Brill,
supra note 102, at 73–74.
120
Given O’Keeffe’s desire to contribute to the art education of minorities
in the South, this compromise is likely the closest Fisk University could come to
honoring O’Keeffe’s original intent. See Brill, supra note 102, at 73.
121
Dan Austin, Detroit Museum of Art, HISTORIC DETROIT,
http://www.historicdetroit.org/building/detroit-museum-of-art/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2015).
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See generally Mark Stryker, DIA in Peril: A look at the Museum’s Long,
Tangled Relationship with Detroit Politics and Finances, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Sept. 8, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://archive.freep.com/interactive/article/20130908
/ENT05/130905007/DIA-in-peril-museum-s-relationship-Detroit-politics-
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largely without the help of the city—which ended funding for new
acquisitions in 1955,125 the DIA’s collection grew to be ranked
among the top six art collections in the United States.126
In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
after amassing more than $18 billon in debt.127 At the time, the
City’s creditors pushed the DIA to auction one of the City’s most
valuable assets—the $4.6 billion art collection.128 A group of large
foundations with ties to Detroit met to work out a compromise that
would help retirees keep their pensions and prevent the DIA from
deaccessioning its world-class collection.129 On November 7, 2014,
Judge Steven Rhodes of the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan accepted the conditions of this “grand
bargain” and the City of Detroit emerged from bankruptcy with its
art collection intact.130
In this case, the push to deaccession came from an outside
source, the city’s creditors, rather than the director and trustees of
the museum.131 In fact, during the period of the bankruptcy, the
DIA waged a difficult battle to prevent any deaccessioning by
poring over archives for evidence of donor intent that would result
in protracted litigation, fighting requests to have the entire
finances (discussing the extensive history of the Detroit Institute of Arts’
relationship with local political and financial turmoil).
125
Kennedy, Grand Bargain, supra note 100.
126
A Brief History, DETROIT INST. ART, http://www.dia.org/about/history
.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
127
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 113, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2013) (“The City estimates its debt to be $18,000,000,000. This consists of
$11,900,000,000 in unsecured debt and $6,400,000,000 in secured debt. It has
more than 100,000 creditors.”).
128
Jordan Weissmann, Detroit Exits Bankruptcy, Thanks to Its Art
Museum, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Nov. 7, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/moneybox/2014/11/07/detroit_exits_bankruptcy_city_s_pensions_saved_i
n_part_thanks_to_detroit.html.
129
Randy Kennedy et al., Foundations Aims to Save Pensions in Detroit
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Kennedy, Foundations],
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/300-million-pledged-to-save-detroits-art
-collection.html.
130
Kennedy, Grand Bargain, supra note 100.
131
See In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, slip op. at 1 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2014).
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collection appraised by auction houses, and working with
foundations and donors to raise over $800 million.132 This case
provides a strong argument for why strict rules against
deaccessioning are beneficial. If the foundations that made up the
grand bargain had not stepped in, the city may have been forced to
sell the artwork to raise money for pensions—public outcry might
have demanded it.133 The existence of such strict deaccessioning
guidelines prevented the museum from using its collection as
capital, allowing the DIA to delay deaccessioning at least through
this budget crisis.
Other institutions struggling for survival in the face of financial
crisis may not receive the “grand bargain” that saved Detroit.134 As

132

Kennedy, Grand Bargain, supra note 100; see also In re City of Detroit,
slip op. at 1 (denying motion to direct debtor to cooperate with a committee of
creditors and appraisers to assess the art collection of the Detroit Institute of
Arts).
133
Weissmann, supra note 128 (“In April 2013, the city’s governorappointed emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, informed the DIA that it would have
to contribute at least $500 million to paying off Detroit’s debts, even if meant
selling off paintings at auction.”). The public at large was not entirely
sympathetic to the plight of the DIA, despite the fact that the DIA operated
almost entirely without the support of the city and had been doing so for years.
See Kennedy, Grand Bargain, supra note 100 (discussing how the city
demonstrated a lack of support when it stopped providing funds to the museum
for acquisitions in 1955).
134
The grand bargain that saved Detroit and the $30 million bailout
received by the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art in 2008 from
billionaire Eli Broad are likely the exceptions. See Finkel, supra note 23. With
approximately twenty-six museums closing in 2009, it is evident that the level of
financial assistance demonstrated in Detroit and Los Angeles is rare. Judith
Dobrzynski, RIP: Museum Closures In 2009 — Not a Huge Toll, Actually —
UPDATED, REAL CLEAR ARTS (Dec. 17, 2009, 4:26 PM),
http://www.artsjournal.com /realcleararts/2009/12/museum_closures.html; see
also Allison Meier, Resting in Pieces: The Scattered Fate of Closed Museums,
HYPERALLERGIC (Sept. 20, 2013), http://hyperallergic.com/84447/resting-inpieces-the-scattered-fate-of-closed-museums/ (discussing the aftermath of
museum closures due to shifts in interests and dwindling funding); Sandy
English, Economic Crisis Devastates Museums Across the US, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Sept. 2009), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009
/09/muse-s12.html (discussing the impact of the economic crisis on art and
museums in the United States). For more detailed examples, see Section C,
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a part of this deal, the DIA will no longer be an entity of city
government.135 Rather, it will return to the control of a private
trust, cutting its ties to the financial fate of the City of Detroit.136
This means that the DIA must rely more heavily on private donors,
many of whom have already pledged significant capital to assist
the troubled institution.137 For its own part in the grand bargain, the
DIA must contribute almost $100 million to the City of Detroit.138
This significant debt could potentially raise the issue of
deaccessioning again if the museum fails to raise the funds.
However, having fought stringently against deaccessioning, the
DIA likely could not attempt to sell art to pay its debt without
upsetting many constituents. These supporters not only include the
foundations that saved it in the grand bargain, but also the
pensioners of Detroit who took losses to protect the collection, and
the larger public who was led to believe that art should never be
used to pay the bills.139
C. The Delaware Art Museum
The Delaware Art Museum (“DMA”) became the latest
recipient of AAMD sanctions in June 2014, after it sold a PreRaphaelite painting by William Holman Hunt—Isabella and the
Pot of Basil—for $4.25 million in order to pay a construction
bond.140 Earlier that year, the museum “announced it would sell as
many as four works to raise $30 million to repay construction debt
[from its 2005 renovation] . . . and replenish the endowment.”141
infra, on the struggles of the Delaware Art Museum and Part VI, infra,
discussing four museums that closed after 2009.
135
Kennedy, Grand Bargain, supra note 100.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., Judge Rejects Detroit Pensioners’ Bankruptcy Appeal, THE
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015, 6:51 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story
/news/local/detroit-city/2015/10/02/detroit-pensioners-lose-appeal-bankruptcycuts/73212550/ (discussing how some Detroit retiree groups, angry about
reductions to their pensions, are still challenging the Detroit bankruptcy plan,
including the Grand Bargain, in court).
140
Fishman, Outlier, supra note 101.
141
Id.
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Unlike Fisk University or the DIA, the DMA did not have a
creative solution to avoid deaccessioning. Its decision to
deaccession work in order to pay debts and regain solid financial
footing “violated one of the most basic and important of AAMD’s
principles” which is that “works can only be deaccessioned to
provide funds to acquire . . . art and enhance a museum’s
collection.”142
In a June 18, 2014 statement, the AAMD admonished the
DMA for not vigorously pursuing other alternatives to
deaccession:
With this sale, the museum is treating works from
its collection as disposable assets, rather than
irreplaceable cultural heritage that it holds in trust
for people now and in the future. It is also sending a
clear signal to its audiences that private support is
unnecessary, since it can always sell additional
items from its collection to cover its costs.143
However, museum CEO Mike Miller was optimistic: “We take
comfort in knowing that the museum will remain open and
continue to serve our community.”144
The DMA’s decision to deaccession work followed a stream of
museum closures after the financial crisis of 2008.145 In choosing
deaccessioning over closure, the museum drew the ire of the
professional community,146 though it still receives support from
local sources of funding.147 Following the announcement of
AAMD sanctions, Delaware Division of the Arts Director Paul
Weagraff said in a statement that, “what [is] most important in our
funding consideration is that the organization . . . continues to

142

Press Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., Association of Art Museum
Directors Sanctions Delaware Art Museum (June 18, 2014) [hereinafter AAMD
Press Release], https://aamd.org/for-the-media/press-release/association-of-artmuseum-directors-sanctions-delaware-art-museum.
143
Id.
144
Fishman, Outlier, supra note 101.
145
Cirigliana, supra note 71, at 368, 369 & n.34.
146
See AAMD Press Release, supra note 142.
147
Fishman, Outlier, supra note 101.
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provide quality arts programming that serves Delawareans and
visitors alike.”148
In September 2014, the DMA announced that it had
successfully retired its $19.8 million bond debt from the proceeds
of the sale of the Hunt painting and an Alexander Calder sculpture
titled Black Cresent, as well as from its investment portfolio
funds.149 In June 2015, the museum announced that, following the
sale of two additional works, Winslow Homer’s Milking Time and
Andrew Wyeth’s Arthur Cleveland, it had completed its planned
sale of artwork and successfully avoided closure.150 Despite the
AAMD sanctions, the museum has maintained a busy exhibition
schedule fueled largely by the museum’s own extensive collection
of 12,500 works and the support of the local artistic community.151
The DMA has also expanded community access in the year
following sanctions by adding extended hours on Thursdays and
Sundays during which admission is free.152
III. THE PERILS OF DEACCESSIONING
For museums like the DMA, the choice between
deaccessioning to fulfill financial obligations and permanently

148

Id.
Press Release, Delaware Museum of Art, Delaware Art Museum Retires
Debt (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.delart.org/press-room/press-statementdelaware-art-museum-retires-debt/.
150
Press Release, Delaware Museum of Art, Sale of Art Complete (June
29, 2015), http://www.delart.org/press-room/press-statement-2/.
151
See Margie Fishman, Delaware Art Museum Pushes Ahead After Selling
Works, DELAWAREONLINE (July 15, 2015, 1:11 PM) [hereinafter Fishman,
Delaware Art Museum Pushes], http://www.delawareonline.com/story/life
/2015/07/03/selling-art-delaware-art-museum-pushes-ahead/29669631/. Specific
examples of exhibits from the collection include exhibitions on John Sloan, art
nouveau illustrations, and Wilmington artists of the 1970s-80s. See Past
Exhibitions, DEL. ART MUSEUM, http://www.delart.org/exhibitions/pastexhibitions/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
152
Press Release, Delaware Museum of Art, Delaware Art Museum
Extends its Hours: Free Thursday Evenings and Free Sundays (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://www.delart.org/press-room/delaware-art-museum-extends-its-hours-in2015-free-thursday-evenings-and-free-sundays/.
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closing the doors seems simple: of course “sell art!”153 However,
the larger implications of this decision reveal the reasons why
many museums choose to uphold the AAMD guidelines rather
than follow the path of the DMA, even if avoiding deaccessioning
results in the museum’s closure.154
A. Capitalization of Museum Collections
In 1993, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”)
issued regulations that allowed museums to avoid capitalizing their
collections for the purpose of financial reporting: “[c]ontributions
of works of art, historical treasures, and similar assets need not be
recognized as revenues and capitalized if the donated items are
added to collections held for public exhibition, education, or
research in furtherance of public service rather than financial
gain.”155 Forcing a museum to monetize the collection and record
its value would cause several problems.156 For example, some
museums may not be able to reliably calculate valuations of their
works.157 Even if museums can make an accurate accounting of a
work’s extrinsic value at a given time, values may change due to
forces like changes in taste and trends.158 Further, the intrinsic
value of a work to a museum, such as its educational value or
source of regional pride, is difficult to measure but also very
important.159
Monetizing a collection advances the idea that the collection is
comprised of fungible assets whose sale will support a museum’s
153

Judith H. Dobrzynski, Opinion, The Art of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/opinion/02dobrzynski.html.
154
See infra, Part IV.
155
Summary of Statement No. 116, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD,
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum116.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); see
also AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 17, at 3 (“Member
museums should not capitalize or collateralize collections or recognize as
revenue the value of donated works.”).
156
See Urice, supra note 50, at 213.
157
Id.
158
Id.; see also Weintraub, supra note 25, at 7.
159
See Weintraub, supra note 25, at 1 (discussing the educational and
scholarly functions of a work as important toward gratifying the interested
members of the public).
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operation.160 For struggling museums, monetizing the collection
would likely distort the financial well-being of the institution,
giving an illusion of wealth when none exists.161 It could also hurt
fundraising efforts by distorting the true needs of the museum.162
For these reasons, museums should not be required to capitalize
their collections. However, every time a museum uses its art as
capital, it tests the exceptions regarding the valuation of collections
that the FASB has carved for the museum industry by weakening
the premise that the art is different than other forms of income.163
It is quite possible that the FASB regulations protected the DIA
from having to capitalize its collection in the face of creditor
demands.164 If the FASB were to change the rules, museums facing
creditors or even bankruptcy in the future might not be able to
protect their collections in the same manner as the DIA.
B. Restricted Gifts and Donor Trust
Another consequence of deaccessioning is the erosion of trust
from donors who fund and contribute to a museum’s collection.
This issue arose in the Fisk University case, and it has regularly
surfaced in controversial decisions to deaccession work.165
Donations that have legally binding conditions for their use are
called “restricted gifts.”166 Generally, once a museum has accepted
a gift with a legal restriction, it cannot waive the restriction without
the donor’s consent.167 After the death of the donor, museums can
160

Urice, supra note 50, at 213.
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See id.
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See id.
164
See Report or Affidavit of Bill Schuette, Esq., In re City of Detroit,
Mich., 2014 WL 1388375, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2014), (No. 13-53846),
2013 WL 9638129.
165
See supra Part I (discussing the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s
controversial decision to deaccession a collection donated by Adelaide De
Groot); see supra Part II (explaining how Fisk University’s decision to sell two
works donated by Georgia O’Keeffe resulted in a protracted legal battle between
the university and trustees of the O’Keeffe estate).
166
Marie C. Malaro, Legal Problems of Museum Administration, C379
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 355, 357 (1989).
167
Id. at 365.
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apply to the courts for relief from the restriction using either the cy
pres doctrine or equitable deviation.168 Both of these actions allow
the museum to modify the gift as long as the modifications
conform to the donor’s intentions.169
In the Fisk University case, the application of the cy pres
doctrine allowed the university to modify a restricted gift by
dividing the rights to the O’Keeffe collection with another
museum.170 This allowed Fisk University to remove the collection
from storage171 while raising funds to establish an endowment to
protect the collection’s future.172 Despite violating the original
wishes of the donor, this decision will likely bring long-term
benefits to the collection by making the works available to a new
generation.173 However, museums take a great risk when they
dispose of work against the original intent of the donor. It
communicates to other donors that the museum does not value
donor wishes and that, when faced with a difficult choice, the
museum may no longer protect donated work.174 Even if a
restriction does not have the binding effect of law, the museum
may lose in the court of public opinion since backlash against a
museum can be just as detrimental as legal sanctions, as was the
case in the Met’s de Groot controversy.175
One possible solution is to limit gifts that have restrictions or
require a museum to hold a work in perpetuity. Some museums,
such as the Museum of Modern Art, already refuse to accept
168

Id.
Id.
170
See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 592–93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
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See Brill, supra note 102, at 71–73, 85; see also supra Part II.A
(discussing the intent of donor Georgia O’Keeffe).
172
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173
Had this agreement not been reached, Fisk University may have closed
the art gallery and the works in the O’Keeffe collection might have remained in
storage. See Ryan, supra note 67, at 873 (stating that continued maintenance of
the collection was impracticable); see also Brill, supra note 102, at 85 (“In the
case of Fisk, the paintings at issue are currently in storage.”). Moreover, the
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Bridges Museum. See Crystal Bridges to Welcome its One-Millionth Visitor,
supra note 118.
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175
Id.
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restricted gifts.176 However, smaller museums may not have the
luxury of being so selective with their donors. In these situations,
the donor and the museum are best served through clear
communication that resolves conflicts in advance and articulates
the shared goals of serving the public interest.177 Unfortunately,
many museums do not have well-articulated policies for dealing
with accessions of restricted gifts.178 Solid accessioning policies
can help avoid subsequent challenges to deaccessioning.179
IV. THE TENUOUS LIFE OF AN AMERICAN MUSEUM
While AAMD deaccessioning sanctions can be severe, they
may be preferable to museum closure. The following section will
look at the fate of four museums that have closed since 2009 to
determine the practical consequences of upholding the AAM and
AAMD codes of ethics.
A. The Gulf Coast Museum of Art
In 2009, the Gulf Coast Museum of Art in Largo, Florida
closed its doors after 73 years of service to Pinellas County.180 The
museum, located in county-owned Pinewood Cultural Park, hoped
for a bailout that the county could not afford.181 The Museum
eventually decided to give its collection, which focused on
contemporary art and fine crafts by Florida artists, to St. Petersburg

176
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Malaro, supra note 166, at 357.
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Id. passim.
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Stephens, supra note 36, at 124 (“The best deaccession policy is a good
accession policy.” (quoting NAT’L PARK SERV., MUSEUM HANDBOOK PART II §
6.1 (2000), http://www.nps.gov/museum/publications/MHII/mh2ch6.pdf.)).
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Mike Brassfield, Gulf Coast Museum of Art Closes; Collection to Be
Dispersed, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan 26, 2009, 8:03 PM), http://www.tampabay
.com/news/humaninterest/gulf-coast-museum-of-art-closes-collection-to-bedispersed/970743.
181
Id.
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College (“SPC”).182 The collection was initially housed at the
Florida International Museum at SPC in downtown St. Petersburg,
but it too closed in December 2010.183 Despite this closure, the
College continues to store and exhibit the work at other campus
locations across the County, including the Leepa-Rattner Museum
of Art in Tarpon Springs.184 Carl Kuttler, president of SPC, told the
Tampa Bay Times, “[i]n any case, it will be exhibited and cared
for. We never take a project on that we can’t complete.”185
In the short term, the closing of the Gulf Coast Museum of Art
has had relatively small impact on the community’s access to the
art in the collection. A local institution was able to absorb the
collection in its entirety and ensure its maintenance and
exhibition.186 This is one of the best outcomes for a community
that experiences the loss of a museum—it loses the building, not
the art.
B. The Bead Museum
The Bead Museum in Glendale, Arizona, with a collection of
over 100,000 beads from all over the world, closed its doors in
2011.187 The museum had no endowment fund and was operating
at a $7,000 deficit each month.188 The Bead Museum donated its
entire collection, including its extensive library, to the Mingei
182

Lennie Bennett, St. Petersburg College to Acquire, Exhibit All Art From
Largo Gulf Coast Museum, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009, 9:14 PM),
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AM), http://www.tampabay.com/features/visualarts/florida-international-museu
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Id.
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International Museum in San Diego, California, enabling it to keep
the collection intact.189 Bead Museum Executive Director Kelly
Norton announced the transfer of the collection, and said, “[l]ike
the Bead Museum, Mingei International showcases useful,
handmade objects of timeless beauty that are satisfying to the
human spirit. Our missions are symbiotic, and we are now
confident that the Bead Museum collection will live on.”190
Niche museums like the Bead Museum often struggle to attract
a wide enough audience.191 The museum built itself around a
single collection that had steadily grown for 25 years despite
having no endowment to ensure its protection and maintenance.192
Finding an institution willing to accept the collection intact was a
best-case-scenario for such a collection. Sadly, the receiving
institution is approximately a five and one-half hour drive from
Glendale,193 so the local community lost a resource. However, due
to Glendale’s proximity to Phoenix, its residents have other
cultural resources at their disposal.194
C. Claremont Museum of Art
The Claremont Museum of Art closed its doors in 2009 after
only three years of existence.195 Unlike the other museums
189

Closure of an Arizona Jewel, ARIZ. COMMISSION ON THE ARTS (Mar. 11,
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discussed in this section, the Claremont did not cease to exist, but
rather shuttered its physical space and placed its collection of about
100 works in storage.196 In recognizing the opportunity to “fill an
important role in providing art education to Claremont youth,” the
Museum continues to operate educational programs in the
Claremont schools.197 In addition, the Museum curates “pop-up”
exhibits throughout the community—a model the museum’s
director refers to as a “museum without walls.”198 This Museum,
without its physical location, is finding new ways to conduct
audience outreach and is expanding art offerings in the area.199
Instead of selling work or donating it to a larger institution, the
Claremont Museum of Art reinvented itself. This creative solution
avoids the deaccessioning controversy without resulting in the
closure of the museum. The Claremont Museum survived because
it did not attach sentimental value to its location, nor did it
maintain any large debts.200 For museums whose debts are

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/culturemonster/2009/12/claremont-museum-toclose-doors-on-dec-27.html.
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See id.; Associated Press, Claremont Museum of Art Closes Due to
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See About, CLAREMONT MUSEUM ART, http://claremontmuseum.org/
about/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Ng, supra note 195.
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Sept. 18, 2015).
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See Ng, supra note 195. When the Claremont museum closed in 2009, it
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payment. Id. This amount is low compared to the almost $20 million debt of the
DMA. See Press Release, supra note 149.
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connected to construction projects, however, abandoning the
building may not be an option.201
D. Fresno Metropolitan Museum of Art
The Fresno Metropolitan Museum of Art and Science (the
“Fresno Met”) closure and deaccession is the most disturbing
outcome in this study of recent museum closings. When the Fresno
Met closed in January of 2010 it had over $4 million in debt and
was operating at a loss of almost $100,000 per month.202 In an
effort to close with “dignity and grace,” the museum assigned
assets to a local lawyer and art collector who helped to prepare the
collection for auction.203 The auctions raised over $2 million, and,
with the exception of the City of Fresno, the museum was able to
pay off its creditors.204 The liquidation of the collection resulted in
a single lawsuit: Ansel Adams’ son sued to prevent the sale of his
father’s prints.205 The Adams family eventually settled with the
museum, agreeing to exchange the photos in the Fresno Met’s
collection with others of similar value.206
201
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Although some of the Fresno Met’s exhibits did make their
way to other museums, much of the collection fell into private
hands.207 The City of Fresno backed a $15 million dollar loan to
help renovate the Fresno Met and ended up the owner of an empty
building.208 Fresno, which regularly ranks near the bottom in
livability surveys of American cities,209 also lost an important
cultural institution.210 Additionally, the Fresno Art Museum, the
sole remaining art museum in the region,211 suffered when the
Fresno Met shut its doors.212 Donations dropped sharply and the
operating budget fell from $1.2 million per year in 2009 to
$750,000 in 2015.213
These four studies demonstrate that art museums are incredibly
diverse and serve a wide variety of interests. Sometimes, financial
crises can provide museums with opportunities to become
innovators, finding new and creative methods to serve their
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communities.214 Museums should not overlook the importance of
creative problem solving when considering whether to deaccession
work; deaccessioning should not become an easy solution to
financial difficulties. However, if deaccessioning is the best way to
save a museum, the museum industry should provide a pathway to
make that decision less controversial and more beneficial to the
industry as a whole. Providing more flexible guidance to struggling
museums and encouraging deaccessioned work to remain in the
public trust could also help the larger community when a museum
closes. The best scenario allows the main core of a museum’s
collection to remain in the public trust of the city/region, as was
the case for the Gulf Coast Museum of Art. By providing a
framework that helps museums deaccession work locally or
regionally, the AAMD and AAM could facilitate agreements
between regional institutions when one museum is forced to close
and essentially deaccession all of its work. If there had been a way
to keep more of the Fresno Met’s collection in the Central Valley
region of California, it may have decreased public hostility
regarding the closure and preserved cultural resources for the
public.
V. RETHINKING DEACCESSIONING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
GREAT RECESSION
Good governance is the best way to ensure a museum fulfills
its public duties and the following section examines ways that
museums can better manage acquisitions so that deaccessioning,
when it does occur, is less controversial. Changes in the tax code
and direct funding can also allow the federal government to
actively support museums in financial trouble. However, if
governance fails and financial crisis follows, there needs to be a
mechanism to assist museums that are on the brink of closure in
order to preserve the work for the good of the public. Looking at
museums not as silos of ownership over their individual collections
but rather as part of a community-wide collection of public work
214
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could prevent closures and ensure that deaccessioned work remains
in the public trust.
A. Adopting Clear Accessioning Policies
An important aspect of deaccessioning is the adoption of strong
accessioning policies.215 Accessioning is the formal process by
which art enters into the museum’s collection.216 There are two
parts to accessioning: (1) receiving objects and (2) cataloguing
objects.217 Museums often struggle handling restricted gifts.218
While large institutions can use their prestige as leverage against
restrictions on gifts or reject donations that are too restrictive,
smaller institutions may struggle to attract donors if they impose
strict limitations on donations.219
One method by which the tax system could help smaller
institutions overcome this inconsistency would be to impose rules
that reduce deductions for gifts with restrictions.220 Currently,
donors can deduct the fair market value of the gift at the time of
the donation.221 However, a work with numerous restrictions may
not be worth the fair market value to the museum if it includes
costly storage or continuous display.222 If the fair market valuation
was decreased when limitations are imposed on a gift, it could
215
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217
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encourage donors to reevaluate their restrictions.223 At the very
least, it would encourage the museum and the donor to have a clear
conversation about both the donor’s intent and the collection
management policy of museum.224
Accession policies also impact deaccessioning policy because
museums spend tremendous amounts of their budget on the
preservation, storage, and conservation of their collections.225
These costs often diminish endowment funds, strain relationships
with donors, and lead to situations, like the one at Fisk University,
where the museum is no longer able to keep the work on display or
provide high-quality storage.226
B. Changing the Tax Code to Promote Museum Donations
One obvious policy solution to help financially unstable
museums is to increase public funding so that they would not be
forced to make difficult choices regarding deaccessioning.227 The
National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) helped fund over 3,000
visual arts exhibits and handed out over $145 million in grant
funding in 2014, a $7.6 million increase from 2013.228 However,
most grants are competitive229 and, according to data collected by
the AAM, only a small percentage of museums receive any federal
223
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government funding at all.230 Relying on federal funding is not a
realistic option for any museum, especially those facing financial
stress.
Congress could also use the Tax Code to indirectly support
museums by repealing the portion of the 2006 Pension Protection
Act (“PPA”) that effectively ended fractional giving.231 Critics of
fractional giving who helped pass the 2006 PPA argued that it
produced an unfair tax break for wealthy taxpayers and was
plagued with abuses.232 However, fractional giving helped
museums attract donors 233 and build relationships with wealthy art
collectors.234 It also encouraged donations to museums in a way
that allowed the museum to prepare for more difficult pieces over a
period of years.235 Since these laws have changed, many museums
have seen a sharp decline in donated work.236 Reopening the
fractional giving tax break would provide an indirect subsidy to
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museums and may be a more politically feasible source of public
funding than direct federal grants.237
C. Deaccessioning for a Dynamic Future
The question of whether museums should ever deaccession
work is no longer a controversial topic among American museum
administrators. There is widespread agreement that deaccessioning
should be allowed as a reliable tool in a sound collections
management policy.238 Today, the real controversy revolves
around how to spend the funds generated through
deaccessioning.239 Limiting deaccessioning funds to the purchase
of more art does not always serve the best needs of the institution
or the public. Allowing deaccessioning funds to be used for
broader purposes in limited situations could strengthen the
museum community by introducing work to new audiences,
bolstering the financial security of regional museums, and
strengthening protections on work that is already in the
collection.240 This is not a proposal for the complete abandonment
of rules guiding museums’ deaccessioning practices. The Detroit
bankruptcy case shows that strict guidelines can serve as a
protection for keeping art separate from other museum assets,
which, in turn, protects the work from potential creditors.241
237
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Rather, the following section examines policies that would
encourage the work to stay in the public trust while simultaneously
forcing struggling institutions to secure better financing and
institute stronger governance, thus mitigating many of the potential
risks associated with broader deaccessioning policies.
1. The “Kimmelman” and “Ellis” Rules
Michael Kimmelman of the New York Times proposed a rule
following the deaccession of Asher B. Durand’s Kindred Spirits by
the New York Public Library in 2005.242 Alice Walton, an art
enthusiast and Wal-Mart heiress, purchased Kindred Spirits, an
important regional work, and moved it from the northeast to
Arkansas.243 Kimmelman proposed that the museum community
establish a system by which local museums would have the first
opportunity to purchase deaccessioned work.244 According to
Kimmelman, “whenever art is sold by a public institution—which,
receiving tax breaks, can be expected to make some sacrifice
toward the public good—local museums should be given a
reasonable period of time to match the sale price.”245
Adrian Ellis, founder of AEA Consulting, offered an expanded
version of this rule. His consequentialist perspective focuses on the
need to provide public access to art:
[Y]ou can deaccession and spend the money on
whatever you want—a new roof, working capital,
education programs, or even a boffo night out with
your chums on the board—provided that you ensure
that the institution or individual to whom you sell
commits in some binding form to equal or higher
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conservational standards and equal or higher public
access.246
Ellis believes that all art owners, whether a nonprofit museum, a
private collector, or a corporation, have the responsibility to
conserve art works and ensure the widest possible public access.247
If the selling institution could use the funds from these sales for
any purpose, as long as the art sold remains accessible to the
public, then the goal of keeping the work in the public trust would
be accomplished and the struggling museum would have funds that
it could apply to its most pressing needs.
While expanding the use of deaccessioning proceeds to
operating costs opens institutions to significant risk, these dangers
could be minimized through clear policies that limit the availability
of this option. One major concern about using the work from the
collection to fund operations and repay debt is that it turns the
collection into a fungible asset that can be too easily accessed as
the need arises.248 Critics contend that allowing this practice will
leave museums without art.249 Furthermore, if selling artwork is an
option, museum management may lack incentive to conduct
fundraising.250 However, these concerns could be alleviated by
requiring museums who want to use funds from deaccessioning for
wider purposes to open their books to an oversight committee,
preferably under the egis of the AAMD or AAM as these
246
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organizations have the best resources and institutional knowledge
to provide support. This kind of oversight committee could be
charged with not only helping financially struggling museums
become more stable, but also with working to keep art in the public
trust when deaccessioning does occur.
2. Moving Towards Community-wide Collections
Management
The solutions posed by Kimmelman and Ellis require a broader
view of the “public trust” than current museum practice allows.251
Without donor restrictions, the transfer of a work from one
museum to another should be able to satisfy the ethical standards,
even if the funds are used for purposes other than collections
management. Much like current loan practices between museums,
the proceeds from which are largely unrestricted, selling work
within the museum community could be part of a community-wide
collections management plan.252 Such a plan would view all of the
work in a larger community as part of one public collection, rather
than treating the work as the “asset” of any individual museum.253
251
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This does not mean individual museums would lose control over
their work, or no longer have the responsibility of protecting and
exhibiting the work in their collection. Rather, when it comes to
deaccessioning work from one museum, other institutions in the
community would have a stake in how that transaction occurs,
including the option to purchase the work before it goes to
auction.254
One challenge to a community-wide collections management
plan would be defining the community.255 Kimmelman suggested
that priority should be given to local museums.256 This, perhaps,
overlooks the need for public access to artwork in areas of the
country less culturally wealthy than New York. Derek Fincham has
suggested a public trust model that would require an understanding
of the work’s historical, aesthetic and educational importance
before allowing the work’s sale.257 Museums could also ask these
questions before transferring work to museums in other regions.
Under a community-based collections management approach, the
Delaware Art Museum’s Isabella and the Pot of Basil, which
Christie’s sold to a private collector in London,258 may have at
least remained in an American museum and perhaps even one on
the East Coast.
Given the dangers of relaxing limitations on deaccessioning,259
an added layer of oversight would ensure that museums that need
to deaccession work to raise capital are doing so responsibly and as
a last resort. This oversight could take the form of many of the
the United Kingdom’s export conditions, which examines the cultural and
regional significance of a work for sale. Id. at 33–35. Fincham suggests that this
type of regulation should come from state or federal legislation, or from the
courts. Id. at 33. This Note argues that the museum industry would be better
served by immediate reforms enacted by the private organizations that currently
regulate the museum practices.
254
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255
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requirements that museums must show after AAMD and AAM
sanctions and/or loss of accreditation, such as providing evidence
of financial solubility and a commitment to avoiding using artwork
as income in the future. Struggling museums could then be acting
with the support of their professional organizations rather than
their condemnation. Expanding deaccessioning with the help,
rather than hindrance, of the AAMD and AAM may provide a
more pragmatic solution to the problems that many museums are
currently facing. For example, if the members of the Academy who
voted to sell member work to strengthen the financial future of
their organization could have done so with the help of the AAMD,
rather than sanctions, those valuable works might still be available
to the public. Furthermore, in a scenario like the Fresno Met,
where closure seemed the only option, the facilitation of the
deaccessioning of the entire collection by a committee of trusted
members of the museum community could have helped to ensure
that more of the work remained in the region.
CONCLUSION
Deaccessioning is a complex problem that raises questions of
ownership, museum governance, and public trust. The current
system does not allow enough flexibility to address the variety of
needs that museums face when dealing with financial crisis and
uncertainty. It is clear that deaccessioning is not always a realistic
solution to the financial problems that plague museums;
sometimes, closing the physical doors can in fact create a fresh
opportunity to reach target audiences. But when selling the art is
the obvious answer, finding ways to mitigate the harms while
saving the museum is clearly the best policy for protecting the
public trust. If these answers could be facilitated by the
professional organizations that currently regulate the museum
community, rather than through legislation or court opinions, it
would strengthen the American museum industry and continue the
long tradition of self-regulation that makes American museums so
unique.
Moving towards a community-based collections model, in
which collections from many museums are viewed as one larger
public entity, could open new opportunities for communication and

DEACCESSIONING: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

289

partnership between institutions. These partnerships, assisted by
the AAMD and the AAM, could ensure that when a museum
deaccessions work that the work remains accessible to the public.
Supporting a community-wide approach would also allow more
interaction between museums and professional organizations,
potentially allowing for earlier intervention when an institution
faces financial difficulties, before there is a possibility of closure.
This, along with greater oversight of museum governance and
some changes to the federal tax code, could ensure that more
museums stay healthy and more people have access to great
cultural resources. Because museums cannot serve and educate the
public if they are closed, preventing closure should be a priority of
the professional organizations that regulate them.

